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This Essay examines the role of small business in the process of economic
growth and the effects of increasing regulation and civil liability. First, the
Essay explores the basic mechanisms of economic growth in society and
explains how small business, as opposed to large business, contributes to
economic growth. Next, the Essay analyzes to what extent increased regulation
and civil liability disproportionately impacts small business operations and the
effectiveness of various Congressional benefits and preferences toward small
business in relieving these perceived burdens. Finally, Priest applies this
analysis to various issues attending the role of small business in economic
growth. The Essay concludes that satisfYing more particularized consumer
demands enhances consumer welfare, that small businesses are likely to be
more effective in achieving this end, and that forms of regulation or civil
liability that differentially affect small businesses reduce societal welfare.
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I.. INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses various issues relating to the role of small business in
the process of economic growth and the effects of increasing regulation and
civil liability on that small business role. In the United States, largely for
political and, perhaps, historical reasons, small business' has attained a status of
veneration as constituting the most basic foundation of growth in the economy.
As one of a multitude of examples, The State ofSmall Business: A Report ofthe
President 1997 states:
Small businesses represent the individual economic efforts of our
Nation's citizens. They are the foundation of the Nation's economic
growth: virtually all of the new jobs, 53 percent of employment, 51
percent of private sector output, and a disproportionate share of
innovations come from small firms. Small businesses are avenues of
opportunity for women and minorities, first employers and trainers of the
young, important employers of elderly workers, and those formerly on
public assistance. The freedom of America's small businesses to
experiment, create, and expand makes them powerhouses in our
. 2economIc system.
Though the specific numbers change from year to year, these various
claims are a fixture of the Presidents' State of Small Business annual reports.3
Passages of this nature reflect, in essence, three claims about the contributions
of small business to the society. First, there is a claim that small business
contributes significantly to the economic growth of the nation-"virtually all"
of the new jobs; a "disproportionate" share of innovation. Second, there is a
claim that small businesses are differentially successful in providing economic
opportunities-not only generally, but in particular to marginal workers such as
women, minorities, the elderly and the young; opportunities that are,
presumably, not available or less available in employment in firms of larger
industrial size. Third, there is a claim that working in small businesses
engenders personal values that are related to economic activity, but which
possess a substantial non-economic normative character as well: values such as
independence and self-reliance.
These claims regarding the contributions of small business provide the
justification for the many ways in which Congress promotes or provides
economic advantages to small business. Congress has enacted special programs
involving small business finance, simplified securities registration, special
forms of tax treatment, and debt relief, among many others.4 Moreover, in
specific appropriation bills, Congress often enacts set-asides or other
I The definition of what qualifies as a "small" business is equally the subject of
political forces. The definitional question is addressed infra notes 17-23.
2 THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REpORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1997, at 3 (1998)
[hereinafter STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1997].
3 THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REpORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1999-2000 is the latest
available on the web, available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/stateofsb99_00.pdf (200 I).
4 For a review of many of these programs, see Joshua E. Husbands, Comment, The
Elusive Meaning of "Small Business", 2 1. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 355,364-70 (1998).
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differential premiums that direct government procurement toward firms that
meet the relevant (and often changing) qualifications as "small business."s All
of these various programs are justified on the grounds of the importance of
small business to America's individualistic values and in stimulating economic
growth.6
Despite these various programs, however, there remain continual concerns
about the health of small business in our modern economy. Various
commentators have addressed the seeming relative disadvantage of small
business to large in responding to and complying with increasing levels of
local, state, and federal regulation in our society. The most thorough of these
modern treatments is an article written by Dean James L. Huffman.7 In this
Article, Dean Huffman puts forth the conjecture that compliance with the
various forms of health and safety, employment, environmental, and economic
regulation in the U.S. over the ~ast decades has differentially burdened small in
comparison to large business. According to what I will call the Huffman
Conjecture, this differential burden derives from the imposition through
regulation of a form of both fixed and variable costs on enterprises that have
substantially more debilitating effects on the contributions to the economy of
small business in comparison to large.9 The conjecture is highly plausible. In
addition, although the point has not been fully elaborated, the expansion of
enterprise liability in tort law since the 1970s could be argued to equally
impose differentially burdensome costs on small business.
Congress has not ignored these concerns but, surely, has not addressed
them completely. In 1980, Congress enacted four separate statutes dealing with
small business problems. lO More recently, in 1996, Congress enacted the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, II compelling federal regulatory
agencies to consider the effects of their policies on small business. 12 The
effectiveness of these legislative enactments has never been determined. On
their face, of course, they extend only to federal but not state and local
regulation, and they do not address in any way the impact of increased civil
litigation.
5 See. e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-
661, 100 Stat. 3816 (1986) whose effects will be discussed infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
6 See Husbands, supra note 4, at 358-59.
7 James L. Huffman, The Impact ofRegulation on Small and Emerging Businesses, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 307 (2000). For another treatment of this question, see WILLIAM
A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESSES (1986) and sources
cited therein.
8 Huffman, supra note 7, at 308.
9 Id. at 313-14.
10 This legislation is discussed infra note 37-41.
II Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
12 See generally, Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 123 (1997).
HeinOnline -- 7 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 4 2003
4 THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 7:1
I do not contest the importance of individualism or self-reliance as values
central to the country nor the importance of small business in promoting them.
There is a question, however, as to exactly how small business, as opposed to
large contributes to economic growth? Secondly, to what extent can we observe
the conjectured deleterious effects of increased regulation and civil liability on
small business operations? Finally, what has been the impact of the various
Congressional benefits and preferences toward small business?
This paper will attempt to analyze these questions from an economic
perspective. Part I addresses very simply the basic mechanisms of economic
growth in any society. Part II examines the role of small business in an
economy. As we shall see, small business, as opposed to large, is likely to be of
increasing significance in the particular context of discrete markets where
economies of scale are technologically unavailable. Part II will also address
these small business questions using the economic theory of determinants of
firm size, developed most prominently by Ronald Coase and George Stigler.
Part III addresses the effects on small business of increased regulation and civil
liability-reviewing the Huffman Conjecture-and the, presumably, converse
effects of the various incentives and benefits created for small business by
Congress. Part IV attempts an empirical test of the proposition that small
business has been differentially affected by the modern increase in regulation
and civil litigation. It presents some preliminary empirical evidence
(preliminary because of the difficulty of deriving useful data from the multitude
of statistics published by the Small Business Administration) supportive of the
Huffman Conjecture, but which is tempered, perhaps, by the effects of
government small business subsidies. Finally, Part V applies the analysis to
various issues attending the role of small business in economic growth,
including the importance of small business in the economic growth of
developing nations, by documenting the regulatory burden and summarizing
what we can say confidently about the economic role of small business.
II. THE BASIC MECHANISMS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
In order to clearly evaluate the various claims made about the importance
of small business to economic growth, it is useful to consider carefully how
economies grow. This Part presents a very simple statement of what economic
growth means. Part II will then address how small business contributes to this
process.
Economic growth means an increase in the economic value of resources
available to the population. Put simply, there are three basic ways the resources
of a nation or of the world can increase in value. First, existing resources can be
reallocated within a country or as among countries to increase their value. Here,
without changing the nature or extent of resources, a nation becomes richer and
the world is enriched if resources are reallocated to those citizens or to those
uses for which the value of the resources is the highest. As a general matter, the
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availability of market exchange, though constrained by the costs of exchange,
will facilitate this form of economic growth. 13
The second mechanism of economic growth is closely related. The
resources of a nation and of the world increase in value if they are employed
relatively more productively: that is, if employing the same resources and
labor, more value is generated in comparison to their use at some previous
period. A central means for generating greater value from a given set of
resources is the economic process of the division of labor. The division of
labor-specialization of work tasks--ean lead to the production of greater
output from the same investment of labor and capital. Adam Smith in Wealth of
Nations gives the example of the manufacture of pins in which a person
working alone, undertaking each of the separate tasks of pin manufacture could
complete (in Adam Smith's time) at most 10 pins per day; thus, 10 workers
each working alone could complete 100 pins. Where the separate tasks of pin
manufacture are divided among the workers---one drawing the wire, another
tapping the heads, a third sharpening the points, and the like-Smith recorded
the ten workers combined as completing 48,000 pins in a day. 14 Though the pin
example seems quaint today, the principle is universal, and specialization or the
division of labor remains a significant mechanism of economic growth.
The third and final mechanism of economic growth is innovation, though
the reallocation of resources to higher-valued uses and the division of labor
might equally be regarded as forms of innovation. Separately, however, a
nation and the world become richer where new resources are discovered, where
new productive techniques are developed to enhance the value of resources, I5
or where new products or services are invented using existing resources. 16
These are the three central mechanisms of economic growth. The question
to be addressed next is what is the role of small business in this process of
economic growth?
III. THE ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AN ECONOMY
What are the determinants of the role of small business in an economy and
how does small business, as compared to large, contribute to the process of
economic growth? What determines the relative success of small, as compared
to large, business? What are the forces leading to the distribution of firms of
differential size in any economy? 17
13 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford University Press 1976) (1776) (providing a
criticism of various governmental policies that constrain exchange, thus preventing
economic growth of this nature).
14 Jd. at 14-15.
15 This point closely resembles division of labor, except that a new productive
technique may not involve labor specialization.
16 An example is Edison's invention of the light bulb.
17 There is substantial economic literature on the determinants of firm size. For recent
discussions, see Michael D. Whinston, Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost
Theories ofFirm Scope, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 184 (2001); KRISHNA B. KUMAR ET AL., WHAT
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We might begin this discussion by first addressing the question of how we
should define a "small" business as compared to a business that is not small. 18
There is no inherent definition of a "small" business. The definition is
politically charged in the U.S. because of the many non-economic values that
are alleged to derive from small business operations and because of the political
importance of interests acting in the name of small business. Although the
definitions often vary (and the power to define is often delegated for political
reasons),19 U.S. agencies such as the Small Business Administration generally
define a firm as "small" if it employs less than 500 workers.2o This definition is
basically arbitrary.21 If one takes the claims of the importance of small business
to American values seriously, it is an interesting question what size of
establishment is most likely to promote the values of independence, self-
reliance and the like. It is not obvious that the answer to this question depends
on the number of workers employed by a corporate firm in aggregate, as
opposed to, say, the number of co-workers in the individual's workplace or the
extent to which the firm delegates decisionmaking. The various definitions of
"small" business in American law are totally innocent of refinements of this
nature.
The only available rationale for the 500 worker per firm definitional
dividing line as between small and large business is that total employment in
the U.S. is divided roughly in half as between workers employed in firms with
greater and with less than 500 workers.22 Again, this distinction has nothing to
do with values or productivity or any other plausible grounds for differentiating
small from large businesses. Although there are many important practical
implications of the definition of a "small" business--ehiefly, for qualification
for various governmental subsidies-for analytical purposes, a numerical
definition is not important; thus, I will define the conception of a "small"
business qualitatively, referring to nothing more than an establishment with
some limited number of workers?3 The empirical work infra examines the
matter more discriminately.
DETERMINES FIRM SIZE? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7208, 1999).
18 For a very helpful discussion of the treatment of this issue in modern U.S. public
policy, see Husbands, supra note 4, at 364-70.
19 See id.
20 ld. at 366.
21 ld. at 374.
22 Thus, in 1995 there were 52,652,510 workers employed in firms with less than 500
employees; 47,662,436, in firms with greater than 500. STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1997,
supra note 2, at 76. As a general matter, political agencies such as the Small Business
Administration want to increase the number of firms which qualify as "small" businesses. It,
perhaps, strains credulity to describe firms with greater than 500 workers as small; thus, the
less-than-500 worker demarcation maximizes the plausible set of what can be called small
businesses. In other contexts, however, political pressures have led Congress to delegate the
"small business" definition to its agencies. See Husbands, supra note 4.
23 Brock & Evans define a small business as those businesses much smaller than the
largest businesses in the same industry. BROCK & EVANS, supra note 7, at 4. This definition,
though helpful in many contexts, is unworkable in industries dominated by what everyone
would agree to be small businesses-say, dry cleaning-and of course remains dependent on
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How does small business fit into an economy? First, many products and
services command only small markets, i.e., there exists limited consumer
demand for the particularized product or service itself. Obviously, a limited
demand can be satisfied by a firm of limited size-thus, a small business. Of
course, limited demands can also be satisfied by large businesses where the
business is able to coordinate production to meet that demand. Large businesses
may not achieve such coordination in many contexts. Thus, an initial role of
small business is to meet the demand of limited sets of consumers for
particularized products or services where coordination costs prevent
satisfaction of that demand by larger businesses.
Meeting limited demands is not a trivial role for small business in an
economy. The larger the set of limited demands that are satisfied, the richer the
economy will be. Put conversely, an indicia of an impoverished economy is one
in which some variety of limited consumer demands are not satisfied in the
market and consumers are left to satisfy their demands individually without the
benefit of market exchange or division of labor, described above.
A large market, in contrast, is one in which there exists a sufficient
concordance of consumer demand to take advantage of technological scale
economies of production or distribution. A more precise definition, however,
can be provided here. In many respects, no two consumers are alike and each
consumer would prefer products and services most closely designed to meet his
or her preferences. Over some range, however, the cost reductions from taking
advantage of scale economies prevail over the magnitude of differences in
consumer values and preferences for individually designed products.24 Large
business emerges where the cost savings from scale economies prevail.
In an interesting article, George Stigler attempted to relate the size
structure of firms to the process of division of labor, elaborating on Adam
Smith's famous aphorism that "the division oflabor is limited by the extent of
the market.,,25 Adam Smith's point was that, as markets expand and become
larger, there are greater opportunities to take advantage of specialization in
production. This point, however, is not exactly related to the determinants of
firm size. There is no doubt that Smith was correct26 that specialization in
production only becomes advantageous at a certain scale of production and,
more perceptively, that as the scale of production increases, the benefits of
specialization are likely to increase.
Production specialization and firm size, however, are not necessarily
related. Specialization can occur within a firm or among firms. As Ronald
Coase has shown, firm size is determined by the relationship between
managerial efficiencies (costs) as among larger and smaller firms and the
the reader's understanding of "much smaller"; as an example, the former American Motors
was always much smaller than General Motors and Ford.
24 Brock & Evans define the converse as "economies of specialization." BROCK &
EVANS, supra note 7, at 42.
25 George J. Stigler, The Division ofLabor is Limited by the Extent ofthe Market, 59 J.
POL. ECON. 185 (1951), reprinted in THE ORGANIZAnON OF INDUSTRY 129 (1968).
26 My teacher, Ronald Coase, often commented that Adam Smith was always correct.
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market transaction costs of arranging contracts among firms for the provision
of productive inputs.27 The existence of a firm indicates a substitution from
managerial command-i.e., a manager organizing production by direct
employees-to transactions by contract through the market where production is
achieved by someone else's employees. As Coase explained in 1937, if there
were no market transaction costs, there would be no firms. Conversely, as
market transaction costs diminish, there are greater op~ortunities for separate
firms to individually manage different productive tasks.
One might, thus, amend Adam Smith's aphorism to read: the demand for
the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market; the supply for the
division of labor is limited by the relationship between managerial costs and
market transaction costs. According to this view, businesses survive as small
where their organization better succeeds in managing specialization in
production and where these managerial efficiencies are not overwhelmed by the
costs of market transactions.29 Large firms, in contrast, survive where
economies of scale in production or distribution are greater than the additional
difficulties of large-scale management and the costs of market transactions.30
In considering the contribution of small business to an economy, however,
we should return to the general point that all consumers would prefer products
that are more, rather than less, personalized. This creates inherent pressures
toward making markets smaller and smaller, which is to say, more and more
particularized to the demands of individual consumers. Large firms may well
satisfy the demands of small markets but, by definition, the satisfaction of those
demands increases managerial costs within the firm. Small business serves an
economy by satisfying the demands of small markets for which there are no or
lower scale economies of production or distribution. Small business also serves
an economy by satisfying demands where the managerial costs of large
business are greater than the market transaction costs of dealing by contract
rather than by control within a firm. The lower the market transaction costs, the
larger the scope of small business and the more that the specialized demands of
small markets will be satisfied.
IV. MODERN REGULATION AND THE HUFFMAN CONJECTURE
In an important article published in 2000, Dean James L. Huffman set
forth the proposition that increased levels of governmental regulation-health
and safety regulation, employment regulation, environmental regulation, and
economic regulation-inflict differential burdens on small and emerging
27 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in THE
FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
28 Id.
29 This point is similar to the analysis in Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The
Division ofLabor, Coordination Costs, and Know/edge, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1992), though
they place greater emphasis on the growth of knowledge.
30 Here, again, there are serious definitional problems since many large firms are
internally organized as an affiliation of small firms. See BROCK & EVANS, supra note 7, at
27.
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businesses in comparison to large businesses.31 These differential burdens
derive from the combination of the fixed and variable costs necessitated by
compliance with these various regulations. The differential burden on small
business of an identical set of fixed costs is obvious. The variable costs of
compliance are likely also to be higher for small business because compliance
is likely to be attended by some level of scale economy.32 Although Dean
Huffman did not elaborate the point, it is equally plausible that the expansion of
enterprise liability since the 1970s in tort law has imposed differentially
burdensome costs on small business.
Put in terms of the analysis in Part II of the determinants of firm size, the
costs that derive from increased regulation and civil liability can be viewed as
increasing the market transaction costs of dealing among firms as against
within a single firm. 33 It follows that the costs associated with increased
regulation and civil liability should affect the size structure of firms within the
society as Dean Huffman predicted. As regulation and civil liability increase,
there are increased cost incentives to shift production to a larger firm in
contrast to production among some set of smaller firms. Empirically, therefore,
holding other effects constant, we should observe a shift away from production
in smaller firms toward production in larger firms as regulation and civil
liability expand.
If true, there is a consequent welfare effect attending this change in
production. The shift from production in smaller toward larger firms will mean
that the opportunities in a society for meeting the demands of relatively smaller
markets (or creating smaller markets) will decline, diminishing societal
welfare. The diminution in welfare is likely to be difficult to measure because it
represents, to take one example, a consumer shifting from a more personalized
to a less personalized product-a shift that may not be recorded in measures of
aggregate output. Moreover, to the extent that production through small
business generates other, non-economic (or less economic) benefits, such as
fostering a sense of independence or self-reliance, the shift from production in
small toward large business will diminish welfare in those dimensions as well.
As described earlier, Congress has promoted small business over the years
through a variety of statutory enactments providing preferences in government
procurement, direct loan subsidies, subsidies of other forms, and tax benefits,
among others. While these various benefits may serve to combat, to some
extent, the effects on small business of the differential costs of regulation and
civil liability, they often create other incentives as well. As is obviously
necessary, each statute must define in some way those businesses that will
31 See Huffman, supra note 7, at 308. There is substantial literature attempting to test
the effects of regulation on firm size. For a summary, see BROCK & EVANS, supra note 7.
Brock & Evans also point out that some forms of regulation-as an example, local building
codes-may differentially benefit small businesses as against large. Id. at 11.
32 See Huffman, supra note 7, at 313-315.
33 Of course, it is important to distinguish costs of regulation that are essential1y fixed
by firm from those that vary according to firm output. It is the fixed costs of regulation that
differentially burden small business.
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qualify for the government largesse. Sometimes the qualifications for the small
business preference will be defined in terms of total assets (not exceeding some
number), total indebtedness, number of employees, magnitude of sales, or some
other numerical indicia that separates those firms that qualify for the benefit
from those that do not.34 Because these benefits can be of substantial value,
they too will have an influence on the characteristics of firm size?5 That is, if a
given procurement preference is available only to firms with, for example, less
than one hundred employees, there are incentives to limit the job force within
the firm to less than one hundred-incentives that may have nothing to do with
the costs of organization through management versus transaction in the market.
Also, because these incentives derive from governmental benefits, rather than
costs, organizational changes in response to them represent a diversion of
resources and, thus, will diminish rather than enhance societal welfare.
Empirical verification of the Huffman Conjecture, therefore, will be
complicated by the consequences to firm organization of the provision of
governmental benefits to small business. Here, however, the definition of
"small" can be specified. There are no economic grounds for defining a
business as small or not. In terms of economics, firm size will be determined by
the relationship between managerial costs and the costs of market transactions.
The government, in contrast, by defining the qualifications of those firms
eligible to receive the government largesse, can directly establish incentives for
the survival of firms of a definite size.
What has been the course of the size distribution of firms in the American
economy over past decades? The next Part will attempt to look empirically at
changes in the size structure of U.S. firms in recent years to examine the
Huffman Conjecture.
V. U.S. PRODUCTION BY SMALL VERSUS LARGE BUSINESS, 1967-1995:
TESTING THE HUFFMAN CONJECTURE
This Part attempts a preliminary empirical view of changes in production
in the United States according to the size of the productive enterprise over the
period 1967-1995. The study is preliminary, in large part, because of the
difficulty of obtaining information about firm size despite the voluminous
statistics published each year by the Small Business Administration. Each year,
attached to the President's State of Small Business annual report to Congress
are hundreds of tables, presenting statistics on various aspects of small business
operation. It seems immediately obvious that, if one were interested in the
relative success of small versus large business, statistics on employment by
firm size would serve as the most accurate measure. The Small Business
Administration, which compiles these statistics, appears to have minimal
interest in employment figures. The greatest attention in these statistics is given
to the number of establishments-the number of different incorporations-
34 See, e.g., Husbands, supra note 4, at 364-70.
35 Brock & Evans have also described the effects of governmental incentives on
reducing firm size. See BROCK & EVANS, supra note 7, at 101.
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which is a peculiar statistic since it is generally unrelated to the aggregate
number of citizens at work in these establishments. Determining from the
statistics aggregate employment in firms of different size is possible, but
difficult; the data are often incomplete and even contradictory within a given
year's report. The data reported in Table I represent my best efforts in
evaluating the available data over roughly a four-month research period.
According to the Huffman Conjecture, the increase in governmental
regulation and civil liability over the past three decades should have had the
effect of increasing the costs of market transactions, leading to a shift toward
production in larger, as opposed to smaller, firms as market transaction costs
increase relative to managerial costs. Conversely, to the extent that Congress
has created incentives that benefit firms of different sizes, the economic effects
of regulation and liability will be affected according to the particular firm size
made eligible for government benefits.
Table I attempts to examine these implications empirically. It presents
figures indicating the proportion of total U.S. employment from 1967 through
1995 according to size of firm measured in terms of number of employees. The
empirical results presented below do not pretend to account in any
comprehensive way for all of the determinants of firm size. These percentages
are arrayed by year (where the data were available) to show the progression
over time in the proportion of employees working in firms of differing size.
Table 1 presents very interesting results regarding the size distribution of
firms in the U.S. economy over the past three decades. Column 1 shows that
the proportion employed in the smallest firms-O to 4 workers per firm-has
declined consistently since 1978, consistent with the Huffman Conjecture. In
1978, 6.0 percent of the workforce was employed in the smallest firms; in
1995, that percentage had fallen to 5.37 percent. A somewhat similar trend
affected workers in the next lowest size group-5 to 9 workers per firm.
Although in the earliest year for which there is data-1978-a low of 5.7
percent of workers were employed in firms of this size, by 1982, that
proportion stood at 7.62 percent. There have been progressive declines since, to
6.42 percent in 1995.
Perhaps a clearer picture can be obtained by focusing on changes in the
largest firms-those with greater than 500 workers-indicated in column 7. If
one simply observes the end-points, the changes appear to be modest.36 In
1967, 46.84 percent of the workforce was employed in large firms; in 1995,
47.51 percent. Observed more carefully, however, there are a number of
different waves of employment within the largest firm size category. Beginning
in 1967 at 46.84 percent, the proportion of the workforce in the largest firms
continued to increase until 1978 when it peaked at 53.7 percent. This was
followed by a precipitous fall to 49.84 percent in 1980 and to 44.23 percent in
1982. Thereafter, the proportion of workers in the largest firms rose steadily
again, reaching 50.3 percent in 1986. This was followed, again, by a
36 Note, however, that in the context of roughly 40 million workers in firms of this size,
a single percentage change is substantial.
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precipitous fall in 1988 to 45.45 percent. The proportion of workers in the
largest firms has steadily increased since then, to 47.51 percent in 1995.
What accounts for these developments? The subject needs further study,
but it is entirely possible that these waves represent a combination of the effects
predicted by the Huffman Conjecture-a general rise in employment by larger
firms in response to the costs of regulation and liability-tempered at various
moments by Congressional action creating incentives toward reorganization in
smaller firms in order to take advantage of governmental subsidies. The
precipitous drop-off in large firm employment in 1982, for example, appears
principally to have been the result of a sudden growth in employment of firms
with 20 to 99 employees. Similarly, the sharp drop-off in large firm
employment after 1986 appears to be the consequence of, again, an equally
sudden increase in employment of firms with 20 to 99 employees.
There is a potential explanation for these findings. As mentioned earlier, in
1980 Congress enacted four separate statutes attempting to reduce the
regulatory burden on small business. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 198037
gave authority to the Office of Management and Budget to constrain paperwork
demands on small business. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 198038
compelled federal agencies to review proposed rules that would exert a
"significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities" and
authorized those agencies to relax regulatory burdens on small businesses in
response to such findings. 39 The Equal Access to Justice Act of 198040
empowered small businesses to recover legal costs in suits against the federal
government. Finally, the Small Business Economic Policy Act of 198041
required federal agencies and departments to coordinate activities to enhance
the economic interests of small businesses.42
None of these statutes created immediate effects. Each of them, instead,
required federal departments and agencies to amend regulations in the future to
benefit small businesses. Of course, it is not known definitively how
extensively or how long this regulatory impulse to benefit small business
continued. Though the findings here do not purport to serve as a study of the
effects of these statutes, it is apparent from column 7 that the share of
employment of large firms declined from 1978 (53.7 percent) to 1980 (49.84
percent)43 and declined even further between 1980 and 1982 (44.23 percent).
After 1982, however, the share of large firm employment again began to rise
through 1986 (49.2 percent in 1984 to 50.3 percent in 1986).
37 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511 § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2812 (1980)
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501-3520 (2000)).
38 Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5
U.S.C § 601 (1994)).
39 BROCK & EVANS, supra note 7, at 23.
40 Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481 §§ 201-03, 94 Stat. 2321
(1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2000)).
41 Small Business Economic Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-302 §§ 301-03, 94
Stat. 833 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631a-b (2000)).
42 These statutes are discussed in BROCK & EVANS, supra note 7, at 23.
43 There are no available data indicating exactly when this decline occurred.
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After 1986, there was further Congressional action. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 198744 introduced major reductions in the
TABLE I: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY FIRM SIZE, U.S. 1967-95
Year Firm Size by Number of Employees
Relatively Small Firms Larger Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All
0-4 5-9 10-19 20-99 <100 100-499 500+
1967 1 18.23 39.93 13.22 46.84
197i 19.25 41.28 12.19 46.52
19762 16.90 37.43 14.30 48.27
19771 18.54 40.12 12.36 47.50
19783 6.0 5.7 6.3 15.2 33.2 13.1 53.7
19802 16.36 35.37 14.78 49.84
19824 6.49 7.62 8.93 19.53 42.57 13.19 44.23
19844 5.7 6.4 6.9 17.0 36.0 14.7 49.2
19865 5.4 6.2 6.7 16.8 35.1 14.7 50.3
19885 5.69 6.90 8.26 19.16 40.28 14.52 45.45
1989 5.51 6.70 8.09 18.93 39.23 14.59 46.13
1990 5.47 6.68 8.07 18.94 39.16 14.50 46.32
1991 5.58 6.68 8.00 18.57 38.83 14.23 46.91
1992 5.57 6.68 7.96 18.44 38.65 14.33 46.99
1993 5.54 6.66 7.91 18.38 38.49 14.58 46.90
1994 5.49 6.54 7.79 18.29 38.11 14.59 47.26
1995 5.37 6.42 7.70 18.36 37.85 14.61 47.51
Note: Several Annual Reports provided only aggregate 0-19 worker percentages:
1967=21.7; 1972=22.03; 1976=20.53; 1977=21.58; 1980= 19.01.
Sources: All derived from respective STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REpORT OF THE






6 1988-1995: 1997 Report.
44 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100
Stat. 3816 (1986).
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finn size standards for defense procurement.45 The Small Business
Administration predicted in 1987 that 509,403 firms within the economy
would-if they remained the same size-lose their "small business" status on
account of these size qualification reductions.46 It is plausible, therefore, that
the decrease in large firm employment between 1986 and 1988 represents not a
refutation of the Huffman Conjecture but, instead, an effort to adjust to this
legislation by changing firm size in order to take advantage of the new
opportunities for small firms created by Congress, without regard to the
economic fundamentals of firm organization.
If so, then the shifts in 1988 represent a form of step adjustment. The
trends in firm employment in the years following the adjustment, through the
most current figures available, again provide a test of the Huffman Conjecture.
The data from 1988 through 1995 are entirely consistent with the Huffman
prediction. Table 1 shows that the proportion of total U.S. workers employed in
small business declined consistently over the period 1988 through 1995.
Column 1, for example, shows that the percentage of all workers employed in
the smallest businesses-less than five workers-declined from 5.69 percent in
1988 to 5.37 percent in 1995. There are similar trends among firms of 5 to 9
workers (a decline from 6.89 to 6.42 percent, column 2); firms with 10 to 19
workers (a decline from 8.54 to 7.70 percent, column 3); and in firms with 20
to 99 workers (a decline from 19.16 to 18.35 percent, column 4).
Conversely, columns 6 and 7 show that in firms of relatively larger size-
100 to 499 workers (column 6t7 and with greater than 500 workers (column
7)-proportionate employment has increased. Thus, the proportion of total
workers in firms with 100 to 499 workers has increased, modestly, from 14.52
to 14.61 percent. The largest increase has occurred in firms with greater than
500 workers, in which the proportion of total employment has increased over
the period from 45.45 to 47.51 percent (column 7).
A clearer measure of the relative changes in total employment as between
relatively smaller and larger businesses is obtained by comparing columns 5
and 7. Column 5, a summation of columns 1 through 4, provides a total of the
proportion of employment in all firms with less than 100 employees. Column 5
shows that the proportion of total employment declined from 40.28 percent in
1988 to 37.85 percent in 1995. Again, in contrast, column 7 shows that for
45 For a description of these changes, see THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REpORT OF
THE PRESIDENT 1987 at 325-27; THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REpORT OF THE PRESIDENT
1988 at 181-84. See also, Small Business Size Regulations, 13 C.F.R. §121 et seq. (2000)
(proposed rules for implementing the size reductions).
46 See Small Business Size Standards for Construction and Surveying Services
Industries and Subcontracting Limitations, 52 Fed. Reg. 47937,47940-41 (Dec. 17, 1987)
(codified at 13 C.F.R. § 121).
47 Note that this paper departs from the Small Business Administration definition of
"small" here; the Small Business Administration continually trumpets increases in total
employment within small business relying chiefly on aggregate totals, not relative
percentage increases among all workers, and classifying firms with 100 to 499 workers-for
which relative employment has increased over this period-as small businesses.
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firms with greater than 500 employees, the proportion of total employment
increased from 45.45 percent in 1988 to 47.51 percent in 1995.
These findings are suggestive of two propositions: First, the Huffman
Conjecture-that increasing local, state and federal regulation imposes
differential burdens on small business as compared to large-seems consistent
with the data. Table I shows that over the periods 1967 through 1978, 1982
through 1986, and 1988 though 1995-periods over which it is plausible that
the extent of regulation and civil liability were expanded-relatively large
businesses grew more rapidly than small. Indeed, the differential growth in
employment accelerated as between the early years represented in the data and
the more recent years. The percentage differential as between employment in
firms with greater than 500 workers and firms with less than 100 almost
doubled from 1988 to 1995. These findings support the Huffman Conjecture.
The second proposition suggested by the data is that the magnitude of the
effect of regulation and civil liability may be significant. As indicated above,
the differential growth in large business employment is substantially greater
than the increase in small business employment. This finding might be
especially noteworthy since, as a rough evaluation, we might imagine that other
determinants of the magnitude of market transaction costs-such as the growth
of the internet and e-commerce-would seem to be reducing these costs, thus
increasing the feasibility and attraction of small business production. At least
through 1995, the aggregate forces appear the opposite; small business appears
to be declining relative to large, not increasing as one would imagine from the
vast facilitation of market transactions that has derived from the development
of the internet.
These conclusions are preliminary; better and more recent data will
indicate whether the relative decline in small business has continued through
the past years in which internet development has accelerated even further.
Nevertheless, the findings are interesting enough to warrant additional study of
the effects.
VI. SOME FURTHER 1MPLICAnONS
This Part expands, in a preliminary way, some of the implications of the
analytical approach by suggesting further ways of thinking about the role of
small business both in developed and developing economies.
A. Regulation, Civil Liability and Small Business
First, the hypothesis that expanded regulation and civil liability
differentially harm small business and that these harms are reflected in the
relative decline of small business in the years of study gains plausibility as the
more precise mechanisms of the effect are taken into account. There exist both
fixed and variable cost components to compliance with regulation and the
standards of civil liability. It is straightforward that these costs are likely to be
differentially burdensome to small business.
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More precisely, however, the criticism of the effect of regulation on small
business is that both the regulatory and civil liability processes must necessarily
operate generally on all firms, large and small. As a consequence of these
administrative constraints, the mandates of regulation and civil liability cannot
be designed to address particular circumstances or the specific details of any
business operation, but must be defined generally in a one-size-fits-all
manner.48 However effective in the aggregate this form of regulation might be
(or however necessary regulation at this level of generality is because of
bureaucratic constraints), it is ill-designed to deal with features particular to
small and multi-varied businesses. As a consequence, small businesses are
differentially disadvantaged by the expansion of these forms of regulation or
civil liability.
The point, therefore, is not simply that greater regulation harms small
business. Instead, the point is that the economic forces that generate demands
which smaller businesses are relatively better able to accommodate are forces
of specialization, responsiveness to specific and discrete demands, and
particularization: all in conflict with forms of governmental regulation, whether
through agencies or civil liability, that are necessarily less specialized, less
responsive to specific conditions, and less particularized.
B. Small Business and Emerging Economies
One of the great economic puzzles of the modern era is why economies in
many areas of the world--especially sub-Saharan Africa, India and China,
other areas of Southeast Asia, and some areas of South America-have
experienced such low levels (and in the case of many nations in sub-Saharan
Africa, no level) of economic growth since the end of World War II. The most
common recent explanation of the failure of growth in these countries is
corruption, which is undoubtedly an important drain on an economy, though it
is difficult to imagine a political elite able to rob a country of all of its increase
in productivity.
The discussion of how market transaction costs influence the scope of
small business suggests an additional insight into the problem. By definition,
economies in emerging nations are small. Also by definition, small economies
encompass small markets, if only because of the relative poverty of the
country's citizens.
Following World War II, many developing countries adopted policies
embracing the promotion of large business relative to small, often referred to as
the policy of "import substitution." The basic concept of these policies was to
inhibit imports so that a large manufacturing sector could develop internally
within an insular nation. Import substitution policies--efforts to boot-strap an
emerging economy into a developed economy-are today acknowledged by all
to be abject failures for two principal reasons: First, they were notoriously
unsuccessful; with very few exceptions no country adopting these policies has
developed a significant manufacturing sector. Second, the policies deprived the
48 For an elaboration of this point, see Huffman, supra note 7, at 316.
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citizens of these countries of lower cost imports while the policies were in
place.
A further phenomenon attending the failure of import substitution policies,
however, is relevant to the subject here. Though it has not been adequately
studied, it remains a surprise that at the same time that these countries' attempts
to stimulate large business failed, there was also a failure to develop small
business. These economies have remained stagnant without significant large or
small business sectors. The absence of small business sectors is somewhat
surprising given an acceptance of the possibility of the existence of small
markets.
The relationship between small business and legal and market transaction
costs may explain the absence of a significant small business sector. As Ronald
Coase has taught, small businesses survive where legal and market transaction
costs are relatively low. Where these transaction costs are high-perhaps
because of insufficiently developed legal and contractual enforcement
structures-organization in smaller corporate forms becomes increasingly
costly. The failure of small business in emerging economies may be better
attributed to the absence of stable legal and contractual regimes than to inherent
failings in other economic dimensions.49
VII. CONCLUSION: THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROMOTING
SMALL BUSINESS
It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline in any comprehensive
fashion the normative grounds for policies that promote small as against large
business. Many of these grounds may be non-economic in nature, such as to
encourage self-reliance, independence, free and unconstrained (or less
constrained) endeavor, and the like. From the standpoint of economic analysis,
it is not evident that there are clear normative grounds to prefer employment or
productivity in a firm of larger or smaller size. The analyses of Coase and
Stigler are normatively neutral with respect to firm size.
Though the point has not been developed sufficiently here, however, I
believe that an argument can be made that satisfying more particularized
consumer demands enhances consumer welfare and that small businesses are
likely to be more effective in achieving this end. It would follow from this
proposition that forms of regulation or civil liability that differentially affect
small as against large business reduce societal welfare and that the shift in
proportionate employment that we have observed over the past decade is
evidence of that harm.
49 For a vivid illustration of this proposition, see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH
(June Abbott trans., Harper & Row 1989) (1817); see also, KUMAR ET AL., supra note 17, at
26 (showing in a cross-national study of Europe, that countries with better judicial systems
have larger proportions of smaller firms within similar industries).
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